Systemic losses in banking networks: indirect interaction of nodes via asset prices

The aim of this paper is to quantify and manage systemic risk caused by default contagion in the interbank market. We model the market as a random directed network, where the vertices represent financial institutions and the weighted edges monetary exposures between them. Our model captures the strong degree of heterogeneity observed in empirical data and the parameters can easily be fitted to real data sets. One of our main results allows us to determine the impact of local ...

As economic entities become increasingly interconnected, a shock in a financial network can provoke significant cascading failures throughout the system. To study the systemic risk of financial systems, we create a bi-partite banking network model composed of banks and bank assets and propose a cascading failure model to describe the risk propagation process during crises. We empirically test the model with 2007 US commercial banks balance sheet data and compare the model pre...

We introduce a general model for the balance-sheet consistent valuation of interbank claims within an interconnected financial system. Our model represents an extension of clearing models of interdependent liabilities to account for the presence of uncertainty on banks' external assets. At the same time, it also provides a natural extension of classic structural credit risk models to the case of an interconnected system. We characterize the existence and uniqueness of a valua...

The 2008 financial crisis illustrated the need for a thorough, functional understanding of systemic risk in strongly interconnected financial structures. Dynamic processes on complex networks being intrinsically difficult, most recent studies of this problem have relied on numerical simulations. Here we report analytical results in a network model of interbank lending based on directly relevant financial parameters, such as interest rates and leverage ratios. Using a mean-fie...

Complex non-linear interactions between banks and assets we model by two time-dependent Erd\H{o}s Renyi network models where each node, representing bank, can invest either to a single asset (model I) or multiple assets (model II). We use dynamical network approach to evaluate the collective financial failure---systemic risk---quantified by the fraction of active nodes. The systemic risk can be calculated over any future time period, divided on sub-periods, where within each ...

The European sovereign debt crisis has impaired many European banks. The distress on the European banks may transmit worldwide, and result in a large-scale knock-on default of financial institutions. This study presents a computer simulation model to analyze the risk of insolvency of banks and defaults in a bank credit network. Simulation experiments reproduce the knock-on default, and quantify the impact which is imposed on the number of bank defaults by heterogeneity of the...

Using particle system methodologies we study the propagation of financial distress in a network of firms facing credit risk. We investigate the phenomenon of a credit crisis and quantify the losses that a bank may suffer in a large credit portfolio. Applying a large deviation principle we compute the limiting distributions of the system and determine the time evolution of the credit quality indicators of the firms, deriving moreover the dynamics of a global financial health i...

The global financial system can be represented as a large complex network in which banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions are interconnected to each other through visible and invisible financial linkages. Recently, a lot of attention has been paid to the understanding of the mechanisms that can lead to a breakdown of this network. This can happen when the existing financial links turn from being a means of risk diversification to channels for the propagation of r...

We analyze cascades of defaults in an interbank loan market. The novel feature of this study is that the network structure and the size distribution of banks are derived from empirical data. We find that the ability of a defaulted institution to start a cascade depends on an interplay of shock size and connectivity. Further results indicate that the ability to limit default risk by spreading the lending to many counterparts decreased with the financial crisis. To evaluate the...

As impressively shown by the financial crisis in 2007/08, contagion effects in financial networks harbor a great threat for the stability of the entire system. Without sufficient capital requirements for banks and other financial institutions, shocks that are locally confined at first can spread through the entire system and be significantly amplified by various contagion channels. The aim of this thesis is thus to investigate in detail two selected contagion channels of this...