August 3, 2000
Many complex systems, such as communication networks, display a surprising degree of robustness: while key components regularly malfunction, local failures rarely lead to the loss of the global information-carrying ability of the network. The stability of these complex systems is often attributed to the redundant wiring of the functional web defined by the systems' components. In this paper we demonstrate that error tolerance is not shared by all redundant systems, but it is displayed only by a class of inhomogeneously wired networks, called scale-free networks. We find that scale-free networks, describing a number of systems, such as the World Wide Web, Internet, social networks or a cell, display an unexpected degree of robustness, the ability of their nodes to communicate being unaffected by even unrealistically high failure rates. However, error tolerance comes at a high price: these networks are extremely vulnerable to attacks, i.e. to the selection and removal of a few nodes that play the most important role in assuring the network's connectivity.
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Tolerance against failures and errors is an important feature of many complex networked systems [1,2]. It has been shown that a class of inhomogeneously wired networks called scale-free[1,3] networks can be surprisingly robust to failures, suggesting that socially self-organized systems such as the World-Wide Web, the Internet, and other kinds of social networks [4] may have significant tolerance against failures by virtue of their scale-free degree distribution. I show that ...
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