Bid distributions of competing agents in simple models of auctions

We investigate the problem of wealth distribution from the viewpoint of asset exchange. Robust nature of Pareto's law across economies, ideologies and nations suggests that this could be an outcome of trading strategies. However, the simple asset exchange models fail to reproduce this feature. A yardsale(YS) model in which amount put on the bet is a fraction of minimum of the two players leads to condensation of wealth in hands of some agent while theft and fraud(TF) model in...

For the first time ever, we analyze a unique public procurement database, which includes information about a number of bidders for a contract, a final price, an identification of a winner and an identification of a contracting authority for each of more than 40,000 public procurements in the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2011, focusing on the distributional properties of the variables of interest. We uncover several scaling laws -- the exponential law for the number of bidd...

While auction theory views bids and valuations as continuous variables, real-world auctions are necessarily discrete. In this paper, we use a combination of analytical and computational methods to investigate whether incorporating discreteness substantially changes the predictions of auction theory, focusing on the case of uniformly distributed valuations so that our results bear on the majority of auction experiments. In some cases, we find that introducing discreteness chan...

This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the other bidders. In the two-bidder case, we derive an optimal randomized bidding algorithm, by which the disadvantaged bidder can procure at least half of the auction objects despite the adversary's a priori knowledge of his algorithm. In the ...

The arrival process of bidders and bids in online auctions is important for studying and modeling supply and demand in the online marketplace. A popular assumption in the online auction literature is that a Poisson bidder arrival process is a reasonable approximation. This approximation underlies theoretical derivations, statistical models and simulations used in field studies. However, when it comes to the bid arrivals, empirical research has shown that the process is far fr...

Statistical mechanics provides a useful analog for understanding the behavior of complex adaptive systems, including electric power markets and the power systems they intend to govern. Market-based control is founded on the conjecture that the regulation of complex systems based on price-mediated strategies (e.g., auctions, markets) results in an optimal allocation of resources and emergent optimal system control. This paper discusses the derivation and some illustrative appl...

We consider nonparametric identification of independent private value first-price auction models, in which the analyst only observes winning bids. Our benchmark model assumes an exogenous number of bidders N. We show that, if the bidders observe N, the resulting discontinuities in the winning bid density can be used to identify the distribution of N. The private value distribution can be nonparametrically identified in a second step. This extends, under testable identificatio...

We propose a general stochastic framework for modelling repeated auctions in the Real Time Bidding (RTB) ecosystem using point processes. The flexibility of the framework allows a variety of auction scenarios including configuration of information provided to player, determination of auction winner and quantification of utility gained from each auctions. We propose theoretical results on how this formulation of process can be approximated to a Poisson point process, which ena...

A 24-hour exchange market was created on the Web to trade political futures contracts using fictitious money. In this online market, a political futures contract is a futures contract which matures on the election day with a liquidation price determined by the percentage of votes a candidate receives on the election day. Continuous double auctions were implemented as the system for order storage and price discovery. We drew market participants in the form of tournaments in wh...

Statistical mechanics provides a useful analog for understanding the behavior of complex adaptive systems, including power markets and the power systems they intend to govern. Transaction-based control is founded on the conjecture that the regulation of complex systems based on price-mediated strategies (e.g., auctions, markets) results in an optimal allocation of resources and an emergent optimal control. We outline a model based on strict analogies to thermodynamic quantiti...