The Timing of Bid Placement and Extent of Multiple Bidding: An Empirical Investigation Using eBay Online Auctions

Widespread e-commerce activity on the Internet has led to new opportunities to collect vast amounts of micro-level market and nonmarket data. In this paper we share our experiences in collecting, validating, storing and analyzing large Internet-based data sets in the area of online auctions, music file sharing and online retailer pricing. We demonstrate how such data can advance knowledge by facilitating sharper and more extensive tests of existing theories and by offering ob...

This dissertation examines three distinct big data analytics problems related to the social aspects of consumers' choices. The main goal of this line of research is to help two sided platform firms to target their marketing policies given the great heterogeneity among their customers. In three essays, I combined structural modeling and machine learning approaches to first understand customers' responses to intrinsic and extrinsic factors, using unique data sets I scraped from...

We empirically investigate fluctuations in product prices in online markets by using a tick-by-tick price data collected from a Japanese price comparison site, and find some similarities and differences between product and asset prices. The average price of a product across e-retailers behaves almost like a random walk, although the probability of price increase/decrease is higher conditional on the multiple events of price increase/decrease. This is quite similar to the prop...

We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the price they paid in a sequence of identical auctions, we provide algorithms for non-parametrically estimating the bid distribution of each bidder, as well as their value distributions under equilibrium assumptions. We provide finite-sample esti...

Understanding bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions remains an ongoing challenge for researchers. Despite their widespread use, theoretical insights into the bidding behavior, revenue ranking, and efficiency of commonly used multi-unit auctions are limited. This paper utilizes artificial intelligence, specifically reinforcement learning, as a model free learning approach to simulate bidding in three prominent multi-unit auctions employed in practice. We introduce six algori...

We consider a class of auctions (Lowest Unique Bid Auctions) that have achieved a considerable success on the Internet. Bids are made in cents (of euro) and every bidder can bid as many numbers as she wants. The lowest unique bid wins the auction. Every bid has a fixed cost, and once a participant makes a bid, she gets to know whether her bid was unique and whether it was the lowest unique. Information is updated in real time, but every bidder sees only what's relevant to the...

This special issue is a product of the First Interdisciplinary Symposium on Statistical Challenges and Opportunities in Electronic Commerce Research, which took place on May 22--23, 2005, at the Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park (\url{www.smith.umd.edu/dit/statschallenges/}). The symposium brought together, for the first time, researchers from statistics, information systems, and related fields, all of whom work or are interested in empi...

This paper presents a novel mechanism design for multi-item auction settings with uncertain bidders' type distributions. Our proposed approach utilizes nonparametric density estimation to accurately estimate bidders' types from historical bids, and is built upon the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, ensuring satisfaction of Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and $\delta$-individual rationality (IR). To further enhance the efficiency of our mechanism, we introduce two...

Motivated by online advertising auctions, we study auction design in repeated auctions played by simple Artificial Intelligence algorithms (Q-learning). We find that first-price auctions with no additional feedback lead to tacit-collusive outcomes (bids lower than values), while second-price auctions do not. We show that the difference is driven by the incentive in first-price auctions to outbid opponents by just one bid increment. This facilitates re-coordination on low bids...

Online marketplaces are the main engines of legal and illegal e-commerce, yet their empirical properties are poorly understood due to the absence of large-scale data. We analyze two comprehensive datasets containing 245M transactions (16B USD) that took place on online marketplaces between 2010 and 2021, covering 28 dark web marketplaces, i.e., unregulated markets whose main currency is Bitcoin, and 144 product markets of one popular regulated e-commerce platform. We show tha...